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A Content Neutral Public Nudity Ordinance That
Satisfies the O'Brien Test May Require Erotic
Dancers to Wear G-Strings and Pasties Without
Violating Their First Amendment Right of Freedom
of Expression: City of Erie v. Pap's A.M.
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW -

AND EXPRESSION -

FIRST AMENDMENT

THE O'BRIEN TEST -

-

FREEDOM OF SPEECH

The Supreme Court of the

United States held that a content-neutral ordinance, aimed at
combating the negative secondary effects of public nudity, satisfied
the O'Brien standard for restrictions on symbolic speech and was,
therefore, a constitutionally permissible restriction on freedom of
expression.
City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
Pap's A.M. ("Pap's") owns and operates "Kandyland," an Erie,
Pennsylvania, club featuring totally nude erotic dancing by women.'
In September of 1994, the City of Erie enacted a public indecency
ordinance that makes knowingly or intentionally appearing in
public in a state of nudity a summary offense. 2 The dancers at
1. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
2. Id. at 283. Ordinance 75-1994, codified as Article 711 of the Codified Ordinances of
the City of Erie, provides in relevant part:
1. A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public placea. engages in sexual intercourse
b. engages in deviate sexual intercourse as defined by the Pennsylvania
Crimes Code
c. appears in a state of nudity, or
d. fondles the genitals of himself, herself or another person commits Public
Indecency, a Summary Offense.
2. "Nudity" means the showing of the human male or female genital, pubic hair or
buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering; the showing of the female breast
with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple; the exposure of
any device, costume, or covering which gives the appearance of or simulates the
genitals, pubic hair, natal cleft, perineum anal region or pubic hair region; or the
exposure of any device worn as a cover over the nipples and/or areola of female
breast, which device stimulates and gives the realistic appearance of nipples and/
or areola.
3. "Public Place" includes all outdoor places owned by or open to the general public,
and all buildings and enclosed places owned by or open to the general public,
including such places of entertainment, taverns, restaurants, clubs, theaters, dance
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"Kandyland" must wear pasties and G-strings to comply with the
3
statute.
Two days after the ordinance went into effect, Pap's filed a
complaint seeking declaratory relief and a permanent injunction
against the ordinance's enforcement. 4 The Erie County Court of
Common Pleas granted the permanent injunction and struck down
the ordinance on the grounds that it was unconstitutional as
facially overbroad. 5 On appeal, the commonwealth court held that
the ordinance did not violate Pap's First Amendment rights or the
Pennsylvania Constitution and reversed the trial court.6 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review and held that the
ordinance violated Pap's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to
freedom of expression, thus reversing the commonwealth court's
7
decision.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court first made a determination that
nude dancing is expressive conduct and is entitled to some
protection under the First Amendment. 8 The Court's next inquiry
was whether the ordinance was content neutral in terms of
government interest. 9 The majority concluded that the ordinance
impacted negatively on the erotic message of the dancing and,
therefore, that such an effect was an unmentioned purpose of the
ordinance in addition to the stated purpose of combating secondary
effects.10 As a result, the ordinance was found to be content-based
halls, banquet halls, party rooms or halls limited to specific members, restricted to
adults or to patrons invited to attend, whether or not an admission charge is
levied.
4. The prohibition set forth in subsection 1(c) shall not apply to:
a. Any child under ten (10) years of age; or b. Any individual exposing the
breast in the process of breastfeeding an infant under two (2) years of age.
Id. at 284 (emphasis added).
3. Id. at284
4. Id. The complaint filed by Pap's named the City of Erie, the mayor of the city, and
the members of the city council as defendants. Id.
5. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M, 674 A-2d 338 (Pa- Commw. 1996).
6. Id. at 34445. The appeal to the commonwealth court was a cross appeal because
Pap's sought attorney's fees along with the permanent injunction that was denied by the trial
court. Id. at 341.
7. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 719 A.2d 273, 280-81 (Pa- 1998).
8. Id. at 276. The court noted that this view was adopted by eight members of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
City of Erie, 719 A.2d at 276.
9. City of Erie, 719 A.2d at 277. If an ordinance is unrelated to the suppression of
expression it is not subject to strict scrutiny, but, rather, to the standard adopted in United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), a less stringent standard. City of Erie, 719 A.2d at
277.
10. City of Erie, 719 A.2d at 279. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court looked to Barnes to
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and subject to strict scrutiny.1
The ordinance failed to withstand strict scrutiny because
imposing civil and criminal penalties on offenders, rather than
requiring dancers to wear G-strings and pasties, is a narrower
means of tailoring the ordinance. 12 Consequently, the ordinance was
13
declared an unconstitutional burden on Pap's expressive conduct.
Two justices wrote a concurring opinion stating that they would
have upheld the ordinance under the United States Constitution
because it was similar to the one in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,
but that they would have held that the ordinance violated the
freedom of expression provisions of the Pennsylvania
Constitution. 4
The City of Erie successfully petitioned for a writ of certiorari
from the United States Supreme Court. 5 Pap's filed a motion
seeking to dismiss the case as moot because Kandyland had ceased
16
operating as a nude dance club; the motion, however, was denied.
The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether Erie's
public nudity ordinance violated Pap's constitutional rights to
17
freedom of speech and expression under the First Amendment.
decide whether the ordinance was content-neutral. Id. at 277. The court noted the statute at
issue in Barnes was "stridngly similar" to the Erie ordinance, but went further to note that
the decision was composed of four separate and non-harmonious opinions that agreed on
nothing except that nude dancing was entitled to some First Amendment protection. Id.
Therefore, the court concluded there was no clear United States Supreme Court precedent
on the matter and conducted its own independent determination. Id. at 277-79.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 280.
13. Id. Instead of striking down the entire ordinance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
severed only the public nudity provisions. Id. at 281. This was done pursuant to 1 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 1925 (1995) and the Construction and Severability clause of the Erie ordinance that
states:
It is the intention of the City of Erie that the provisions of this ordinance be
construed, enforced and interpreted in such a manner as will cause the least possible
infringement of the constitutional rights of free speech, free expression, due process,
equal protection or other fundamental rights consistent with the purpose of this
ordinance. Should a court of competent jurisdiction determine that any part of this
ordinance, or any application or enforcement of it is excessively restrictive of such
rights or liberties, then such portion of the ordinance, or specific application of the
ordinance, shall be severed from the remainder, which shall continue in full force and
effect.
Id. at 275 n.6.
14. Id. at 281. The Court never reached the validity of the ordinance under the
Pennsylvania Constitution, finding it violative of the United States Constitution. Id. at 281.
15. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 287.
16. Id. at 287.
17. Id. at 283. "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S.
CONsT. amend I.
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The plurality held that the Erie ordinance was a content-neutral
regulation that satisfies the four-part test of United States v.
18
O'Brien and was, therefore, constitutional.
Before reaching the constitutionality question, the Court resolved
the issue of mootness. 19 Pap's motioned to dismiss on the grounds
it had ceased operations as a nude dance club and, therefore, that
any outcome would have no effect.20 The plurality stated that
simply closing the dance club did not make the issue moot because
Pap's could decide to operate another club in the future.2 ' In
addition, Erie had an ongoing injury because it was prohibited from
enforcing its public nudity ordinance.22 Finally, Justice O'Connor
noted that Pap's attempt to preserve a favorable ruling from the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and to prevent an appeal therefrom,
23
weighed against a finding of mootness.
Turning to the merits of the case, Justice O'Connor recognized
that the state of nudity is not inherently expressive, but that nude
dancing of the type at issue here is expressive conduct within the
outer ambit of the First Amendment. 24 The Court stated, "whether
the ordinance is related to the suppression of expression"
determines what level of scrutiny is to be applied. 25 A strict
scrutiny test would be applied if Erie's purpose in enacting the
ordinance was related to the suppression of expression, but if the
city's purpose was unrelated to the content of the expression, the
less exacting O'Brien standard would be applied. 26 The plurality's
conclusion clarified the holding in Barnes by stating that
restrictions on public nudity, such as in the instant case, should be
18. Id.
19. Id. at 287-89. "Mootness Doctrine is the principle that American courts will not
decide moot cases - that is cases in which there is no longer any actual controversy." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1025 (7th ed. 1999).
20. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 287.
21. Id. at 287. Justice O'Connor also noted that Pap's never mentioned a word about
mootness until after certiorari was granted and the age of Pap's owner, 72, does not make it
certain that he will never again decide to operate a club in the City of Erie. Id. at 287-88.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 288. Pap's prevailed in the state court. Id. The City of Erie brought the appeal
to the United States Supreme Court. Id. Justice O'Connor stated that it would be a
manipulation of the Court's jurisdiction to allow Pap's to preserve the lower court decision
by rendering the issue now moot. Id.
24. Id. at 289. The majority cited Barnes as authority for this proposition. Id.
25. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 289 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)).
26. Id. Erie argued that the ordinance is content-neutral because it regulates conduct,
not speech, and therefore the O'Brien test applied. Id. Pap's argued that the ordinance is
aimed at suppressing expression and, therefore, should be subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at
290.
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evaluated under the O'Brien test for content-neutral restrictions on
7
symbolic speech.
Justice O'Connor began the content-neutrality determination by
recognizing that the ordinance is a general prohibition against
public nudity on its face that targets conduct alone, and is not
directed solely at nudity with an -erotic message but public nudity
as a whole.28 The plurality refuted the contention that the
ordinance is related to the suppression of expression because the
preamble to the ordinance suggests that the ordinance is actually
directed at erotic dancing of the type at issue. 29 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court interpreted this language to mean that the purpose
of the ordinance was to combat negative secondary effects. 30 The

plurality agreed with this interpretation, stating that the ordinance
was aimed at regulating secondary effects such as crime, not at the
31
erotic message emanating from nude dancing.
Justice O'Connor, however, rejected the view held by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court that, although the ordinance had the
one goal of combating secondary effects, it also had an
"unmentioned" goal relating to the suppression of expression. 32 This
view was adopted by Justice White in his dissent in Barnes and
was rejected there as well.3 The Court equated this argument to
27. Id. The Court recognized that the statute in Barnes was almost identical, and
because five members of the Court could not agree on a single rationale in Barnes, they
used this opportunity to clarify the holding in Barnes. Id.
28. Id. at 290. Justice O'Connor also noted that the ordinance updates indecency
ordinances that have been on the books before nude dancing establishments were founded.
Id.
29. Id. The preamble states that city council adopted the regulation:
[F]or the purpose of limiting a recent increase in nude live entertainment within the
City, which activity adversely impacts and threatens to impact on the public health,
safety and welfare by providing an atmosphere conducive to violence, sexual
harassment, public intoxication, prostitution, the spread of sexually transmitted
diseases and other deleterious effects.
Id. at 290.
30. City of Erie, 719 A.2d at 279.
31. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 291. The Court analogized the situation with that in
O'Brien. Id. O'Brien was convicted under a statute banning the destruction of draft cards. Id.
The Supreme Court rejected his First Amendment violation claim, holding that the law was
aimed at maintaining the integrity of the draft system by preventing the destruction of draft
cards and was not aimed at suppressing O'Brien's antiwar views. Id.
32. Id. at 291-92.
33. Id. Justice White's view, that was consistent with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
decision, was that because the ordinance allows the dancers to perform wearing pasties and
G-strings, but not without them, it is specifically the expressive content of nude dancing that
is being regulated. City of Erie, 719 A.2d at 279.
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one that the city had an "illicit motive" for enacting the ordinance.34
Citing Renton v. Playtime Theaters,35 the Court stated that an
alleged illicit motive is not sufficient to strike down a statute that

is otherwise constitutional and has a predominant purpose of
combating

secondary

effects.

36

Thus,

the

Pennsylvania

court's

finding that one purpose of the ordinance is to combat secondary
effects made it no different than the restriction in O'Brien where
the means of expression, and not the expression itself, was being
37

regulated.

Justice O'Connor respectfully disagreed with Justice Stevens's
contention that the ordinance is a complete ban on expression
because the ordinance has the effect of limiting the only means of
38
expressing the erotic message that Kandyland wants to convey.

O'Brien was

again used as

support for the position

that a

regulation is content-neutral if its justification is unrelated to the
suppression of expression even though it may have some incidental
effect on the expressive element of conduct. 39 The Court further
noted that Erie's interest in combating secondary effects caused by
the presence of nude dancing in the area is not related to the

suppression of expression.40 Justice O'Connor stated, "even if Erie's
public nudity ban has some minimal effect on the erotic message
by muting that portion of the expression that occurs when the last
stitch is dropped, the dancers at Kandyland and other such
establishments are free to perform wearing pasties and G-strings..
. any effect on the overall expression is de minimis." 41 The Court
stated that such de minimis intrusions cannot be sufficient to
34. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 292. Pap's argument rested on statements made by the
city's attorney that nudity bans were not intended to apply to "legitimate" theater
productions. Id.
35. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
36. Renton, 475 U.S. at 47-48.
37. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 292.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 293. Justice O'Connor recognized that there may be situations where the
regulation of the means of expression essentially bans the message, but found that such is
not the case here. Id.
40. Id. The majority cited Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288
(1984). In Clark, the Court held that a park regulation preventing homeless people from
sleeping in the park at night was not a violation of First Amendment rights. Id. at 294-97.
The homeless people were sleeping in the park as part of a demonstration to protest the
plight of the homeless. Id. at 291-92. The Court held that the government's interest in
preserving the parks was unrelated to the homeless people's message, and, even though the
regulation may have directly limited the expressive element of their message, it was
content-neutral. Id. at 299.
41. Id. at 294.
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render a regulation content-based if secondary effects are to be
regulated. 42 Justice O'Connor noted that a city, such as Erie, is
justified in enacting an ordinance that bans public nudity to combat
the secondary effects that may result while simultaneously singling
out one specific example of public nudity (e.g., erotic dancing) as
particularly problematic.4
Justice O'Connor went on to illustrate that, contrary to Justice
Stevens's contention, the extension of the secondary .effects
doctrine of Renton is not new." The Court noted the extension of
the doctrine in Ward v. Rock Against Racism.45 Further, in Renton,
adult theatres were singled out from other movie theatres by their
content, but the Court still held the regulation content-neutral
because the ordinance was aimed at the secondary effects of the
theatre and not the content of the movies themselves. 46 Justice
O'Connor noted that the Erie ordinance, on the other hand, is a
content-neutral regulation of conduct on its face. 47 The Court stated
that even if the ordinance mentions clubs like Kandyland as a
specific problem, it is still a content-neutral regulation because it is
designed to combat secondary effects and does not target the
erotic message of nude dancing."
Ultimately, the plurality concluded that Erie's interest in
combating harmful secondary effects resulting from establishments
such as Kandyland is not related to the suppression of the erotic
message conveyed by nude dancing. 49 Thus, the ordinance would be
valid if it met the requirements of the four-factor O'Brien test.6°
The Court concluded that, under the O'Brien standard, the Erie
42. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 294. The Court cited Justice Stevens's opinion in Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976):
[Elven though we recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the total
suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably artistic value, it is manifest
that society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and
lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate.
Id. at 70.
43. Id. at 295. Justice O'Connor viewed this case and the cases of O'Brien, Clark, and
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989), as similar because they involved
government regulations combating harmful secondary effects as opposed to the suppression
of expression. Id. at 294.
44. Id. Justice Stevens claimed that the majority's position is a novel extension of the
secondary effects doctrine. Id. at 317.
45. Id.
46. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 295.
47. Id. at 296.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. The O'Brien test is used to evaluate restrictions on symbolic speech. Id.
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ordinance is constitutional. 51 The first factor, whether the
regulation is within a government's legitimate powers, is satisfied
because Erie's attempt to protect public health and safety are
clearly within the police power of the city. 52 The second factor,
whether the regulation furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest, drew more extensive discussion from the
majority.5
Justice O'Connor stated that the interest in combating the
harmful secondary effects associated with nude dancing is
unquestionably important.54 Justice O'Connor noted that the City of
Erie did not have to conduct independent studies to prove that the
secondary effects are harmful to the city.55 She further noted that
the city can rely on past court decisions that are relevant to the
problem at hand to show the existence of the harmful effects. 56 The
Court found that it was reasonable for Erie to conclude that
harmful secondary effects would result because the same type of
entertainment was at issue in Renton and Young. 57 The Court found
Renton and Young as sufficient foundations for Erie's belief that
the existence of adult entertainment clubs will cause negative
secondary effects.! Therefore, the Court determined that Erie
reasonably relied on Barnes and its discussion of secondary effects
and met the evidentiary standard of Renton. 9
Justice O'Connor noted that, regardless of precedent, Erie relied
on its own evidentiary findings. 60 These findings included a
determination that the city council had firsthand knowledge and
experience of the downtown area and knew what sort of activities
occur around the areas of such entertainment establishments as
51.
52.
53.

City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 296.
Id.
Id.

54.

Id.

55. Id. See also Renton, 475 U.S. at 41.
56. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 296 (citing Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52).
57. Id. at 296-97 (citing Young, 427 U.S. 50 (1976)).
58. Id. at 297. Reliance on a judicial opinion describing the evidentiary basis is
sufficient. Id. (citing Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52).
59. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 297.
60. Id. The preamble to the ordinance in question states:
[T]he Council of the City of Erie has, at various times over more than a century,
expressed its findings that certain lewd, immoral activities carried on in public places
for profit are highly detrimental to the public health, safety and welfare, and lead to
the debasement of both women and men, promote violence, public intoxication,
prostitution and other serious criminal activity.
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Kandyland.6 1 Kandyland failed to attack the city council's findings
or to shed any doubt on their validity.62 In the absence of such
doubt, the Court followed Erie's expert judgment.6
The Court further noted that the city should have adequate
leeway to support the ordinance based on secondary effects
because Erie's ordinance is a facially content-neutral regulation of
conduct and not a regulation of First Amendment expression.6
Justice O'Connor again noted that O'Bien is especially helpful
because the O'Brien Court permitted Congress to take official
notice of the harmful effects the destruction or mutilation of draft
cards would have on the selection system without an independent
inquiry or specific evidentiary record. 65 To the contrary, Justice
Souter would have required such a record from Erie to support its
ordinance.6 Justice O'Connor and the plurality disagreed with
Justice SouterY' The Court stated that no empirical data was
needed because Erie had shown a substantial governmental interest
through establishing, by past decisions of the Court and the city
council's own experience, that the harmful secondary effects relied
upon are real.6 Justice O'Connor noted that it is also evident that,
because nude dance clubs create negative secondary effects like
crime, drug use, and violence, an ordinance banning nude dancing
61. Id. at 297-98.
62. Id. at 298.
63. Id. The Court related the city council's findings to an administrative agency. Id. As
long as an opposing party has an opportunity to challenge a finding, an agency is not
confined to the evidence in the record in reaching its expert judgment. Id. Kandyland had
ample opportunity to challenge the council's findings before the council itself, during the
state proceedings, and in front of the Supreme Court. Id. It only asserted that evidentiary
proof was lacking from the Erie city council's determination. Id.
64. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 298.
65. Id. at 298-99. In O'Brien, the Court simply reviewed the administrative interests and
concluded that Congress had a legitimate and substantial interest in preventing the
destruction and mutilation of draft cards. Id.
66. Id. at 316-17 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Souter
agreed with the plurality's notion that combating the negative secondary effects of nude
dancing is a legitimate government interest and that the Erie ordinance should be evaluated
under O'Brien, but believed that O'Brien was distinguishable because in that case there was
no doubt that the regulation would eliminate the harmful secondary effects. Id.
67. Id. at 300. Justice Souter argued that Erie's findings could not be accepted because
"the subject of nude dancing is fraught with emotionalism" and because secondary effects
must be established by empirical data. Id. at 314 (Souter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
68. Id. Justice Souter's argument regarding empirical data was flatly rejected in Nixon
v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000), where the Court stated that "the
invocation of academic studies said to indicate the threatened harms are not real is
insufficient to cast doubt on the experience of local government." Id.
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would further the government's interest in combating such
problems.69
Justice O'Connor further illustrated that the ordinance satisfies
the third requirement of the O'Brien test, that the government
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. 70 The
Court stated that the fourth and final factor of the O'Brien test is
satisfied as well because the restriction is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of the government interest. 7' As stated
previously, the Court found that the ordinance regulates conduct
and has a de minimis impact on the expressive element of
dancing. 72 The plurality concluded that the G-string and pasties
requirements are minimal restrictions in furtherance of the city's
interest and leave ample room to convey the dancer's erotic
message. 73 Therefore, the Court held that the Erie ordinance is a
valid content-neutral regulation of conduct and reversed the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 7
Justice Scalia, concurring, thought that the case was moot.75
Justice Scalia divided the plurality's decision regarding mootness
into two categories: 1) Pap's may at sometime in the future resume
business, and 2) the City of Erie is suffering an ongoing harm since
the state court invalidated the ordinance. 76 Justice Scalia stated that
it is not disputed that Kandyland no longer exists and that the sole
shareholder has sworn in an affidavit that he operates no active
business and does not plan to do so in the future. 77 He stated that
69. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 300-01. G-strings and pasties may not reduce the
secondary effects greatly, but the O'Brien test only requires that the regulation further the
government's interest. Id. at 301. A city must balance its attempts to combat a problem with
the requirement that a restriction be no greater than necessary. Id.
70. Id. at 301.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. Justice Souter argued that zoning may be an alternative to the ordinance. Id.
However, Justice O'Connor countered that it was uncertain whether zoning would have less
of an impact on expression than the G-string and pasties requirement, and, because the
ordinance is a content-neutral regulation, a least restrictive means analysis was not required.
Id. at 301-02.
74. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 302.
75. Id. (Scalia, Thomas, JJ., concurring).
76. Id. (Scalia, Thomas, JJ., concurring).
77. Id. (Scalia, Thomas, JJ., concurring). The building in which Kandyland was located
has been sold and is currently being used as a comedy club. Id. Nick Panos, the sole
shareholder, gave a sworn affidavit that states he does not "employ any individuals involved
in the nude dance business," "maintain any contacts in the adult entertainment business,"
"has any current interest in any establishment providing nude dancing," or "has any intention
to own or operate a nude dancing establishment in the future." Id.
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the plurality's conclusion that, because Pap's was still incorporated
in Pennsylvania it could decide to start a nude dance club again,
does not suffice under the case law to overcome mootness.7 8
The test for mootness in voluntary-termination cases, according
to Justice Scalia, is whether it is absolutely clear the behavior
could not reasonably be expected to recur.7 9 Justice Scalia
determined that the mootness test was met because of Pap's sworn
affidavit, the age of the sole shareholder, and the timing of the
events concerning the sale of the business and the filing for
certiorari.8° According to Justice Scalia, even if there is a possibility
of Pap's reopening a dance club, there is no reasonable expectation
8
of such. '
Justice Scalia pointed out that the usual practice when mootness
is attributable to the unilateral action of a party who prevailed in
the lower court is to vacate that judgment.8 2 Justice Scalia's
concurrence further noted that a problem with the case is that it
came from a state court and entailed a lack of jurisdiction over
3 The concurring opinion stated that this results in an
vacatur.A
unfortunate consequence but not one that authorized the Court to
hear a matter outside of its power.84 Justice Scalia rested this
conclusion on the fact that the Court has no power to suspend the
Article III fundamental requirement of a "case or controversy."8
Concerning the ongoing injury of the City of Erie, Justice Scalia
stated that although the plurality cited no authority for their
78. Id. at 303 (Scalia, Thomas, JJ., concurring). Erie did not contest Pap's affidavit but
responded by stating that he could very easily get back into the business. Id.
79. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 303 (Scalia, Thomas, JJ., concurring).
80. Id. (Scalia, Thomas, JJ., concurring). Pap's ceased operations and the establishment
was sold a year before the petition for certiorari was filed. Id. Justice Scalia asserted that it
was absurd to assume that Pap's would do this to preserve the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decision before an appeal was ever filed. Id.
81. Id. at 303-04 (Scalia, Thomas, JJ., concurring). Justice Scalia argued the age of
Pap's sole shareholder was not the only basis for his conclusion. Id. at 304 n.2. He did this
to refute the majority's contention that an advanced age of seventy-two does not make it
absolutely clear that a life of quiet retirement is the only reasonable expectation for such a
septuagenarian. Id.
82. Id. at 304 (Scalia, Thomas, JJ., concurring) (citing Arizonans for Official English v.
Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997)).
83. Id. at 305 (Scalia, Thomas, JJ., concurring) (citing ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S.
605 (1989)).
84. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 305. The significance of this problem is that a dismissal
for mootness caused by a unilateral action would leave Erie subject to a legal disability, the
ordinance inoperative, and the city unable to enforce the public nudity regulations against
anyone, not just nude dancers. Id.
85. Id. at 305-06 (Scalia, Thomas, JJ., concurring).
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proposition, they seemed to rely on ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish.86
Justice Scalia noted, however, that ASARCO did retain the "case or
controversy" requirement and the requirement that the parties be
adverse.8 7 According to Justice Scalia, the Court appeared to
eliminate these last requirements, and, in concluding that the case
avoided mootness solely on Erie's ongoing injury, the Court created
a "case or controversy" where only one party was involved.88
Justice Scalia would have dismissed the case as moot for the
reasons already discussed, but because the plurality reached the
merits of the case, he did so briefly as well, agreeing with the
result but not with the mode of analysis.8 He noted that the Erie
ordinance is modeled after the one in Barnes, a case in which he
voted to uphold a statute because it was a general law regulating
conduct and not specifically directed at expression, and was
therefore not subject to First Amendment scrutiny.90 Justice Scalia
noted that Erie's ordinance prohibits the act of public nudity
regardless of whether it is for the purpose of dancing or not. 91
Further, according to Justice Scalia, the preamble of the ordinance
that the plurality discussed does nothing to change this
conclusion.9 2 Justice Scalia commented that there is no basis for
the idea that the ordinance does not apply to other theatrical
productions because the text contains no such limitations. 93 Even if
nude dancing was specifically targeted, Justice Scalia would not
have found it violative of the First Amendment unless it targeted
the communicative part of nude dancing.9 4 Ultimately, Justice Scalia
thought that the reliance placed upon secondary effects was
unnecessary because of his belief that the traditional power of
government to foster morals and the judgment that nude dancing is
86. Id. at 306 (Scalia, Thomas, JJ., concurring).
87. Id. (Scalia, Thomas, JJ., concurring). Justice Scalia dissented in ASARCO.
88. Id. (Scalia, Thomas, JJ., concurring).
89. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 307 (Scalia, Thomas, JJ., concurring).
90. Id. 307-08 (Scalia, Thomas, JJ., concurring). Justice Scalia stated that one would
suppose, and that Erie calculated, that the Pennsylvania courts would have felt bound by the
decision in Barnes. Id. at 307.
91. Id. at 308 (Scalia, Thomas, JJ., concurring).
92. Id. (Scalia, Thomas, JJ., concurring). The preamble merely shows that Erie was
having a public nudity problem with lap dancers and not streakers, sunbathers or hot-dog
vendors. Id.
93. Id. at 308 (Scalia, Thomas, JJ., concurring). The fact that no enforcement attempt
was made on the production of Equus at the same time was due to the fact that no one had
complained about it and not because the ordinance did not apply. Id.
94. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 310. (Scalia, Thomas, JJ., concurring). Justice Scalia
believed the First Amendment is only violated if, "the government prohibits conduct
precisely because of its communicative attributes." Id.
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immoral were sufficient for Erie to enact the ordinance 5
Justice Souter joined in parts I and II of the plurality's opinion
but did not believe Erie had established a sufficient evidentiary
96
basis for sustaining its ordinance and, therefore, dissented in part.
He stated that, under the First Amendment, the need for factual
justifications to satisfy intermediate scrutiny had arisen in recent
cases.97 A specific quantum of evidentiary findings has not been
identified, but the need for some factual justifications was clear
9
according to Justice Souter 8
Justice Souter stated that intermediate scrutiny requires a
regulating government to make some demonstration of an
evidentiary basis for the harm it claims flows from expressive
activity, and for the expected benefit from the restriction
imposed.9 9 The opinion noted that the evidentiary basis can come
from other governments or from legislative invocation of a judicial
opinion, as long as the basis is one of demonstrated fact, not
speculation. 1°° Justice Souter believed that by these standards, the
Erie ordinance fails to establish any such evidence.10' He further
stated that the record is devoid of any findings of fact by the city
council on the problem of secondary effects. 10 2 Justice Souter
determined that the plurality rested its conclusions on the
preamble, which is "slim pickings" on an issue that is "fraught with
emotion."103
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg joined, dissented in
the matter because he believed the plurality opinion incorrectly
extended the secondary effects doctrine to justify the total
suppression of speech. °4 The dissenters stated that the secondary
effects doctrine had only been used in the past to justify the
10 5
location of establishments like Kandyland, not to censor speech.
95. Id. (Scalia, Thomas, JJ., concurring). According to Justice Scalia, the First
Amendment did not abolish these powers. Id.
96. Id. at 310-11 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Souter
would have vacated the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision. Id. at 311.
97. Id. at 311 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Turner
Broad. System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) ("Turner II") and Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) ("Turner I")).
98. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
99. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 313 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
100. Id. at 313-14 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
101. Id. at 314 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
102. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
103. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
104. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 317-18 (Stevens, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
105. Id. at 317 (Stevens, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). Justice Stevens attributed this shift
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Justice Stevens pointed out that the preamble of the Erie ordinance
specifically states that the ordinance was enacted due to the recent
increase in live nude entertainment. 01 6 Further, the Stevens dissent
remarked that dancing nude or in G-strings and pasties are both
forms of expressing erotic messages, but the messages being
conveyed are quite different. 107 Justice Stevens' position was that
even if nude dancing is within only the outer ambit of the First
Amendment, the Erie ordinance still suppresses a message
protected by that Amendment. 08
Justice Stevens believed that precedent did not support the use
of the secondary effects test to support an ordinance that bans
First Amendment speech. 09 He noted that in Young the Court
upheld a zoning ordinance on the basis of the secondary effects
doctrine because the ordinance was only a limitation on the
locations that adult theatres could use." 0 In addition, he noted that
in Renton the Court upheld a similar zoning ordinance because it
regulated the location of theaters and did not deny theaters a
reasonable opportunity to open and operate."' In a footnote to his
opinion, Justice Stevens stated that the plurality's reliance on Ward
as a basis for the extension of the secondary effects doctrine was
misplaced." 2 Justice Stevens pointed out that in Schad v. Borough
of Mount Ephraim"3 the Court struck down an ordinance that
banned all nude dance clubs because, at least according to Justice
Stevens, the secondary effects doctrine does not apply to an
to the plurality's failed attempt to structure a united opinion out of Barnes and believed that
neither precedent nor persuasive reasoning supported the shift. Id. at 318.
106. Id. at 318 (Stevens, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
107. Id. (Stevens, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
108. Id. at 319 (Stevens, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). Justice Stevens referred to Judge
Posner's position in Miller v. South Bend, 904 F2d 1081 (1990), which stated that the
difference between the message of a nude dancer and that of one wearing a G-string and
pasties is significant. Id. at 318-319. The Supreme Court plurality called the difference in
message de minimis. Id. Justice Stevens assumed for argument purposes that the difference
is small. Id. at 319.
109. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 319 (Stevens, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
110. Id. (Stevens, Ginsburg, J.J., dissenting). Young involved a Detroit zoning ordinance
affecting the secondary effects of lower property values and crime. Id. The zoning ordinance
limited where adult films could be exhibited. Id.
111. Id. at 320 (Stevens, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
112. Id. at 320 n.3 (Stevens, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that both
Young and Renton concerned time, place, and manner regulations that. left open ample
alternative channels for communication. Id. He placed Ward in this category and
distinguished it from the instant case. Id. at 321.
113. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
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ordinance that totally bans nude dancing. 114
In addition, Justice Stevens dissented because, in his eyes, the
plurality also erred by lowering the degree of state interest that is
needed to regulate speech and by ignoring the difference between
secondary effects caused by speech and effects on speech caused
by regulation of conduct. 15 Further, according to Justice Stevens,
the addition of G-strings and pasties to nude dancers has no impact
on the secondary effects that Erie is trying to combat." 6 Finally,
Justice Stevens concluded that the O'Brien test could not be
satisfied even if one assumed that secondary effects would be
prevented by such an ordinance because a mere assumption is not
7
sufficient to meet the O'Brien test."
According to Justice Stevens, the plurality also confused the
incidental burdens doctrine with the secondary effects doctrine
even though they are distinct and designed to serve different
interests."8 The dissent emphatically stated that the plurality could
not base the decision on both simultaneously." 9 Justice Stevens
stated that either the Erie ordinance is aimed at speech and is
justified under the incidental burdens doctrine, or it is aimed at
secondary effects and is justified under the secondary effects
doctrine. 20 Thus, Justice Stevens explained that the ordinance
cannot be aimed at secondary effects and rendered unrelated to
2
speech by the incidental burdens test.' '
Justice Stevens believed the ordinance could only be correctly
analyzed by recognizing that nude dancing is expressive conduct
protected under the First Amendment. 122 According to the dissent
the nudity of the dancer is a component of that protected
114. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 321-22 (Stevens, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
115. Id. at 323. (Stevens, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
116. Id. (Stevens, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Scalia
that there is no reason to believe the measures will reduce the secondary effects. Id. at 314.
117. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 324 (Stevens, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). The plurality
concluded that, under O'Brien, the regulation need only further the government interest. Id.
at 300-01.
118. Id. (Stevens, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). The incidental burdens doctrine applies
when speech and non-speech elements are involved and the government's regulation of the
non-speech component justifies an incidental intrusion upon the speech element. Id.
Secondary effects are indirect consequences of speech and may justify regulation of the
location of speech. Id. The incidental burdens and secondary effects doctrines are not
identical. Id. at 324-25.
119. Id. at 326 (Stevens, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
120. Id. (Stevens, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
121. Id. (Stevens, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
122. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 326 (Stevens, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
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expression and the target of the Erie ordinance. 123 By pointing out
that the preamble of the Erie ordinance reveals a purpose of
limiting speech, Justice Stevens asserted that only a compelling
government interest could support such a regulation. 124 Thus,
Justice Stevens dissented. because no such compelling government
25
interest was established.
The right to free expression is a bedrock principle of our nation
rooted in the First Amendment. 26 One of the first cases within
which the Supreme Court addressed the issue of symbolic speech,
the First Amendment paradigm through which nude dancing has
been analyzed, was Stromberg v. California.'2 Stromberg was
convicted of violating a statute prohibiting the display of flags as
an emblem in opposition to the government. 218 Stromberg raised the
flag of the Soviet Union every morning at his children's summer
camp.129 The Court held that the- statute unconstitutionally
suppressed communication and could not be sustained as a
regulation of non-communicative conduct. 30 The Court explained
its decision by stating that the statute was vague as to what
conduct was prohibited and allowed punishment for acts that are
3
within the protection provided by the First Amendment.' '
The Supreme Court revisited the combination of conduct and
speech twelve years later in West Virginia State Board of
Education.v. Barnette. 32 In this case, the issue was whether public
schools could force students to salute the American flag.' 3 The
123. Id. (Stevens, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). According to Justice Stevens, the text of
the ordinance and the plurality's opinion made it obvious that Erie was regulating the
communicative nature of nude dancing. Id.
124. Id. at 327 (Stevens, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). Justice Stevens also looked to the
comments of the city's attorney who said the ordinance would not include the performance
of Equus, a playhouse production at the time. Id. at 328. This narrow view was also
confirmed by the comments of several city council members during the debate on the
ordinance stating that indecent, immoral nudity and not theater nudity was their target. Id. at
329.
125. Id. at 332 (Stevens, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
126. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 362 (1927); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 382 (1927).
127. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
128. Id. at 360-61.
129. Id. at 362. Along with raising the Soviet flag, there was a ritual during which the
children stood and saluted the flag reciting a pledge of allegiance to the "workers' red flag."
Id.
130. Id. at 369.
131. Id.
132. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
133. Id. at 626. The Board of Education passed a resolution on January 9, 1942, which
stated inter alia,
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Court held that such a requirement violated the students'
constitutional rights to freedom of speech and expression.' 4 The
Court found that saluting the flag is a form of utterance that
conveys an idea of acceptance or rejection of that which is being
saluted. 135 Justice Jackson stated that the First Amendment no
more permitted a state to compel allegiance to a symbol of the
organized government than it permitted the state to punish
someone who used a symbol to express peaceful opposition to
organized government.136
Nearly twenty-five years later, the Supreme Court decided United
States v. O'Brien, the landmark case in the area of conduct as
expression. 37 O'Brien and three of his companions burned their
Selective Service registration certificates on the steps of the South
Boston Courthouse in protest of the Vietnam war and thereby
violated a statute prohibiting such acts. 38 O'Brien was convicted
under the statute. 39 In his appeal to the Supreme Court, O'Brien
argued that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him
because the act of burning the registration card was protected
1 40
symbolic speech under the First Amendment.
The Court began its analysis by stating that "[it] cannot accept
the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be
labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct
intends thereby to express an idea."' 4 ' The Court further noted that
Therefore, be it resolved, that the West Virginia Board of Education does hereby
recognize and order that the commonly accepted salute to the Flag of the United
States-the right hand is placed upon the breast and the following pledge repeated in
unison: 'I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America and to the
Republic for which it stands; one Nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for
all'-now becomes a regular part of the program of activities in the public schools,
supported in whole or in part by public funds, and that all teachers as defined by law
in West Virginia and pupils in such schools shall be required to participate in the
salute honoring the Nation represented by the Flag; provided, however, that refusal to
salute the Flag be regarded as an act of insubordination, and shall be dealt with
accordingly.
Id. at 626 n.2.
134. Id. at 642.
135. Id. at 632.
136. Id. at 64142.
137. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
138. Id. at 369-70. When FBI officials who had been at the protest arrested O'Brien, he
told them that he was burning his card because of his beliefs, knowing that he was violating
federal law. Id. at 369.
139. Id. at 371.
140. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
141. Id. The Court asserted that the destruction of registration cards is conduct, alone,
and has nothing to do with speech and is not necessarily expressive. Id. at 375.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 39:705

even assuming arguendo that the burning of a registration card is
within the First Amendment, it is not necessarily afforded absolute
constitutional protection.1 2 Justice Warren, delivering the majority
opinion, explained that when speech and non-speech elements are
intertwined in the same type of conduct, "a sufficiently important
government interest in regulating the non-speech element can
justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms."'"
Eventually the Court delineated what has come to be known as
the "O'Brien test" for analyzing government restrictions on
symbolic speech.'" Under the O'Brien test, a government
regulation is constitutional 1) if the regulation is within the
constitutional power of the government; 2) if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; 3) if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and 4) if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.'" Ultimately, the Court concluded that
146
the test was met and upheld the statute.
One of the first cases dealing with nude dancing and expression
was California v. LaRue.' 47 California passed regulations that
prohibited licensed bars or nightclubs from showing entertainment
that was more gross sexuality than expression.' 48 Even though
recognizing that some of these performances are within the
constitutional limits of the protection for freedom of expression,
the LaRue Court upheld the regulations because they only
regulated and did not prohibit such acts. 49
The next case to arise dealing with nude dancing and freedom of
expression was Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim.'5° Schad
operated an adult bookstore in the Borough of Mt. Ephraim in
which there was a coin-operated machine where one could view
live nude dancers. 151 Criminal penalties were imposed on Schad for
142.

Id.

143.

Id.

144. Id. at 377.
145. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. The Court found that the government met these
requirements in the O'Brien case. Id.
146. Id. at 383.
147. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
148. Id. at 118.
149. Id.
150. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
151. Id. at 62.
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violating a zoning ordinance prohibiting nude dancing.15 2
The issue in Schad was whether the zoning ordinance, which
prohibited all live entertainment, violated the constitutional right of
freedom of expression.lra The Court held that the ordinance, by
excluding live entertainment throughout the Borough, prohibited a
wide range of expression that is protected by the First
Amendment. 1' In doing so, the Court recognized that nude dancing
is not outside of First Amendment protections and that restrictions
on such activity must be justified.15 5 Unfortunately for Mt. Ephraim,
the Court perceived no justification, such as the interests in
avoiding parking or trash collection problems, which could justify
the ordinance. 15
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence5 7 was a
subsequent case also construing an ordinance targeted at
combating
secondary
effects. 1
Community
for
Creative
Non-Violence ("CCNV") conducted a demonstration during which
they erected a city of tents on the Mall in Washington, D.C., but
they were not allowed to sleep in them according to a Park Service
regulation. 159 The Court held that even assuming that sleeping is
expressive conduct, the regulation was content-neutral because it
152. Id. at 63. Section 99-15B of the Mount Ephraim zoning ordinance stated:
"B. Principal permitted uses on the land and in buildings.
(1) Offices and banks; taverns; restaurants and luncheonettes for sit-down dinners
only and with no drive-in facilities; automobile sales; retail stores, such as but
not limited to food, wearing apparel, millinery, fabrics, hardware, lumber,
jewelry, paint, wallpaper, appliances, flowers, gifts, books, stationery, pharmacy,
liquors, cleaners, novelties, hobbies and toys; repair shops for shoes, jewels,
clothes and appliances; barbershops and beauty salons; cleaners and laundries;
pet stores; and nurseries. Offices may, in addition, be permitted to a group of
four (4) stores or more without additional parking, provided the offices do not
exceed the equivalent of twenty percent (20%) of the gross floor area of the
stores.
Id. at 63 n.1.
Section 99-4 of the Borough's code provides that "all uses not expressly permitted in this
chapter are prohibited." Id at 64.
153. Id. at 65.
154. Id. The First Amendment requires a sufficient justification for the prohibition of a
wide range of protected speech and the Borough failed to provide such a justification. Id. at
67-69.
155. Schad, 452 U.S. at 66.
156. Id. at 72-77. The borough produced no evidence that nude dancing caused some of
the secondary effects they were trying to prevent, such as littering and crime. Id. at 73.
157. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 291-92. A National Park Service regulation (36 CFR § 50.27(a)) designates
areas as campgrounds where people are permitted to sleep; the Mall was not designated as
such. Id. at 290.
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was designed to preserve the parks, and that de minimis intrusions
on expression must be allowed if the government is to combat
secondary effects.1 60
In City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., the Court
elaborated on the secondary effects doctrine and applied it to
conduct occurring on private property. 61 Respondents attempted to
open adult theaters in the City of Renton and sought declaratory
and injunctive relief from the Renton zoning ordinance prohibiting
such theaters on respondent's land.1 62 The Court concluded that the
ordinance was constitutional because it was aimed at the
secondary effects of the theaters on the surrounding area, it did
not ban the theaters but simply regulated their locations, and it
was narrowly tailored to affect only those theaters that produced
the secondary effects.16 The Court allowed Renton to rely on other
1
cities' findings of secondary effects to substantiate its regulation. 6
As in O'Brien, the majority noted that the city must be allowed to
experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems and an
alleged illicit legislative motive will not invalidate an otherwise
1 65
constitutional statute.
Texas v. Johnson,1 66 a flag burning case, set forth the framework
for analyzing restrictions on expressive conduct that would later be
used in City of Erie. 67 Johnson was convicted under a Texas penal
law for burning an American flag in protest at the Republican
160. Id. at 293-99.
161. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
162. Id. at 44-45. The ordinance prohibited:
[A]ny "adult motion picture theater" from locating within 1,000 feet of any residential
zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, or park, and within one mile of any
school. The term "adult motion picture theater" was defined as an enclosed building
used for presenting motion picture films, video cassettes, cable television, or any
other such visual media, distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on matter
depicting, describing or relating to specified sexual activities or specified anatomical
areas for observations by patrons therein.
Id. at 44.
163. Id. at 47-52. Narrow tailoring helped the ordinance avoid the overbreadth flaw that
was fatal to the ordinance in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim. Id. at 52.
164. Id. at 51. The Court stated that:
The First Amendment does not require a city, before enacting such an ordinance (as
here), to conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already
generated by other cities so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is
reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses.
Id.
165. Renton, 475 U.S. at 52.
166. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
167. Id. at 397.
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National Convention.-rs In Johnson, the Court took a four-step
approach to analyzing the regulation of expressive conduct: (1)
determine whether the conduct is expressive; (2) if so, then
determine whether the state regulation relates to the suppression of
free expression; (3) if the state's regulation is not related to the
suppression of expression, then apply the less stringent O'Brien
test; (4) if the regulation is related to the suppression of
expression, a more demanding strict scrutiny test should be

applied. 169
The Court recognized, and the State of Texas conceded, that
Johnson's conduct was expressive.'70 The Court stated that the
government has a "freer hand" in regulating expressive conduct
than traditional speech.'7 ' The Court decided that the O'Brien test
did not apply because the regulation was related to the suppression
of expression.' 72 Consequently, the strict scrutiny test was
applied.' 73 After applying strict scrutiny, the Court concluded that
the state's asserted interests in preventing breaches. of the peace
and in preserving national unity did not support Johnson's
conviction and did not justify regulating his freedom of political
expression. 74
Ward v. Rock Against Racism,'75 decided the day after Texas v.
Johnson, extended the secondary effects doctrine into the public
forum.'76 The City of New York passed regulations governing noise
levels in Central Park after numerous complaints from patrons of a
168. Id. at 399. TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09 (West 1989) provides in full:
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly desecrates:
(1) A public monument; (2) a place of worship or burial; or (3) a state
or national flag.
(b) For purposes of this section, 'desecrate' means deface, damage, or otherwise
physically mistreat in a way that the actor knows will seriously offend one or
more persons likely to observe or discover his action.
(c) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
Id. at 400 n. 1.
169. Id. at 403 (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974)).
170. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405. "In deciding whether particular conduct possesses
sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play, we have asked
whether an intent to convey a particularized message was present, and whether the
likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it." Id.
(citing Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11).
171. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406.
172. Id. at 407.
173. Id. at 420.
174.

Id.

175.
176.

492 U.S. 781 (1989).
Id. at 781.
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nearby sheep meadow.1 77 The Court held that the regulation was
content-neutral because the city's principal justification was
controlling noise and not the content of the music. 178 Furthermore,
the Court held that the secondary effects doctrine could be used to
regulate speech in a public forum as long as a regulation is
narrowly tailored and leaves open an alternative channel for
communication of the curtailed speech. 79
The final case in this line, and the one most relied upon by the
Court in City of Erie, is Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc:180 The issue in
Barnes was the constitutionality of an Indiana public indecency
statute that prohibited public nudity.'8 l Respondents were
proprietors who wanted to have dancers totally nude, but the
statute required the dancers to wear G-strings and pasties.18 2 The
Court acknowledged that nude dancing was expressive conduct,
but found the regulation content-neutral because the Indiana
statute was aimed at public nudity across the board, not solely at
nude dancing, and was, therefore, unrelated to the suppression of
free expression.' Consequently, the plurality held that the statute
satisfied the four-part O'Brien test and was, therefore, a valid
regulation4 despite its incidental limitation on some expressive

activity. 18

177. Id.
178. Id. at 785-803.
179. Id. at 790-91. This was an extension of the secondary effects doctrine to the
public forum. Id. Until this point, the Court had applied the secondary effects doctrine to
zoning ordinances affecting commercial enterprises such as in Renton and Schad. Id.
180. 501 U.S. 560 (1991). This decision was split into four opinions (three justices
joined the plurality opinion, two filed separate concurring opinions, and four joined in the
dissent).
181. Id. INDIANA CODE § 35-45-4-1 (1988) provides:
Public indecency; indecent exposure
§1. (a) A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place;
(1) Engages in sexual intercourse;
(2) Engages in deviate sexual conduct;
(3) Appears in a state of nudity; or
(4) Fondles the genitals of himself or another person;
Commits public indecency, a class A misdemeanor. (b) "Nudity" means the showing of
the human male or female genitals, pubic area, or buttocks with less than a fully
opaque covering, the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque
covering of any part of the nipple, or the showing of the covered male genitals in a
discernibly turgid state.
Id. at 569 n.2.
182. Id. at 563.
183. Id. at 565-70.
184. Id. at 567-72. The plurality rested its decision on the proposition that "the statute's
purpose (was] protecting societal order and morality." Id. at 568.
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The Court's holding in City of Erie v. Pap's A.M. followed its
decision in Barnes and is consistent with recent nude dancing
cases. The plurality's opinion clarified Barnes by stating that bans
on public nudity should be evaluated under the framework set
forth in O'Brien for content-neutral restrictions on symbolic
speech. 18 Because the Court has continually held nude dancing to
be expressive conduct, the application of the O'Brien test and the
Texas v. Johnson analysis were appropriate as well.'8 6 With the City
of Erie ruling (following Barnes), the Court has established a
precedent for lower courts to follow that will hopefully bring
certainty to an area that courts across the nation have struggled
with for decades.
However, the Court's decision may have greater effects than are
readily apparent. The decisions in City of Erie and Barnes have
shown an acceptance by the Court of the movement away from the
use of zoning ordinances, as in Renton and Young, toward the use
of public nudity bans to deal with the issue of nude dancing. Cities
across the nation now have a template to follow in framing
ordinances to regulate nude dancing. Legislatures in all fifty states
now know that the Supreme Court will uphold public nudity
ordinances that have substantial justifications and only have de
minimis effects on the expressive element of erotic dancing.
According to the holding in City of Erie, as long as an ordinance
is content-neutral and is targeted at combating negative secondary
effects, governments can regulate erotic dancers and require them
to wear G-strings and pasties. The Supreme Court's adherence to
allowing local governments to use past court decisions to
substantiate the presence of secondary effects makes the
governments' tasks easier. Local governments merely have to look
to the Court's decisions in Erie, Barnes, Renton, or Young for
sufficient evidence of secondary effects. This fact should make
nude dancers and dance club proprietors everywhere shake in their
"go-go" boots because they might be next.
The soundness of the decision in City of Erie will vary
depending upon one's views on erotic dancing. The Court's decision
undoubtedly allows governments to restrict an area of expression
in the name of combating secondary effects. This is a contraction
and not an expansion of an individual's right of expression. As
Justice Stevens said in his dissent, "The Court's use of the
185.
186.

City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 289.
Id.
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secondary effects rationale to permit a total ban has grave
implications for basic free speech principles." 87 This might be
overstating the lasting implications of the decision, but it illustrates
that it does authorize governments to entrench upon first
amendment speech and expression rights.
Although the City of Erie Court viewed the difference in
expression when the last stitch is dropped as de minimis, others
might disagree.lss As one author has stated, "while entertainment
afforded by a nude ballet at Lincoln Center to those who can pay
the price may differ vastly in content (as viewed by judges) or in
quality (as viewed by critics), it may not differ in substance from
the dance viewed by the person at the local pub."18 9 Earlier
regulations on nude dancing were centered on societal order and
public morality. 90 The Court's holding in City of Erie now allows
the justification to be the prevention of secondary effects such as
crime, alcohol abuse, and prostitution.
Regardless of one's thoughts on nude dancing, the value of the
Supreme Court's ruling in City of Erie v. Pap's A.M. cannot be
questioned. The Court's decision was based on sound constitutional
principles that are firmly established in precedent. As previously
noted, the Court has long struggled to establish a permanent test
for judging nude dancing regulations. It established such a test in
City of Erie by applying the O'Brien factors. Opponents and
proponents, alike, now have two consecutive decisions, City of
Erie and Barnes, that illustrate the Court's position in this area and
present the framework for future litigation.
James S. MaUoy

187. Id. at 324 (Stevens, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
188. Id. at 294. Justice Stevens argued that the ordinance is a complete ban on
expression. Id. at 319. (Stevens, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
189. Michael McBride, Note, Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie: The Wrong Route to the Right
Decision, 33 AKRON L REV. 289, 289 (2000).
190. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 568.

